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Abstract
We consider how two groups of regions, which differ in productivity
and public good endowments, compete in tax and public goods to attract
or reject migrants. In our framework the less productive regions receive
public transfers which increase their panoply of public goods. We find
that, whenever public transfers are sufficiently high, migration to the less
productive regions is observed only in the case when the productivity
gap between regions is not extremely wide. We then employ a regression
discontinuity design to empirically assess the causal relationship between
the reception of large amounts of public funds and migration flows in
the EU-15 regions. The theoretical predictions are broadly confirmed as
we find a wide expansion in the share of foreign citizens in the highly-
subsidized regions, when compared to low-subsidized regions with similar
pre-treatment characteristics.
Keywords: migration, fiscal competition, EU Cohesion Policy, regression
discontinuity design
JEL codes: C21, F22, H20, R11
1 Introduction
From an economic point of view, migrations are the empirical expression of
factor mobility across international borders and, therefore, globally increase the
efficiency of production processes. However, from a social point of view, they are
complex events, often costly and wasteful, which require resources and flexibility
both from those emigrating and from those who welcome immigrants. Faced
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with a dramatic increase in migratory flows to high-income countries (United
Nations, 2017), the economic literature has asked itself what the mechanisms
are that guide the choice to migrate and the final destination, in order to help
developed countries to govern this complex phenomenon.
Our study focuses on attraction factors, often named “pull” factors, which
concern economic, social and even personal aspects of migrations. The start-
ing point is the simple framework presented in Hatton and Williamson (2005),
where an individual is more likely to migrate, the higher the compensating dif-
ferential is, i.e. the net wage in the destination country minus the net wage in
the home country, and the lower the fixed migration cost is. In such a frame-
work, there is a clear role for government intervention. Since the 1960s, it has
been well-established that local governments strategically set taxes in order to
prevent migration outflows and to attract mobile factors of production, thereby
generating the so-called race-to-the-bottom, in which taxes are set lower and
lower (Oates, 1968; Gordon, 1983; Wilson, 1986, 1992; Edwards and Keen,
1996). More recently, however, the individual-specific compensating differen-
tial, including welfare benefits, has been identified as a more comprehensive
driver of migration (see, inter alia, Boeri et al., 2002; Facchini and Mayda,
2009). In fact, the availability of public goods and public assistance is now
considered to greatly influence migration decisions. Borjas (1999) shows that
generous welfare programs offered by many U.S. states have become a “magnet”
for immigrants. Concerning the EU-15 countries, which also represent the focus
of our empirical analysis, De Giorgi and Pellizzari (2009) estimate the extent to
which welfare generosity affects the location decisions of migrants. The conclu-
sions are that these welfare magnets are positive but relatively weak, compared
to the role of labor market conditions, such as the unemployment rate and the
level of wages.1 However, the paper suggests that the important issue is to
what extent the variation in the welfare institutions across the countries of the
EU will generate changes and distortions in the flows of migration. Migrations
are also shaped by the availability of public goods such as education, health,
infrastructure and public services. In a recent report by the World Economic
Forum (Schwab, 2017), inadequate or limited urban services and infrastructure
are indicated among the causes of migration (push factors), whereas affordable
and accessible urban services (including health care, education, utilities and
transport) are among the pull factors.
The supply of welfare benefits and of public goods and services is strongly dif-
ferentiated in quantity and quality among European regions (see, among others,
de Jong et al., 2016). De Giorgi and Pellizzari (page 354, 2009) conclude that
“even if the process of economic and social integration has led to harmonization
of several policy dimensions across Europe, very little has been done on the
welfare side, most likely because of political impediments”. Concerning trans-
port infrastructure, the Fifth report on economic, social and territorial cohesion
by the European Commission (page 57, 2010), indicates that the “endowment
of transport infrastructure varies widely across the EU, especially in terms of
1 Kennan and Walker (2010) find an even weaker relationship for the U.S.
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roads. Density of motorways is three times the EU average in the Netherlands
and Luxembourg but is below 10% of average in Romania”. The same report
shows the presence of large disparities in health risks between regions, reflect-
ing different levels of health care quality. Furthermore, access to basic services,
such as compulsory schools, primary health care and banking differ both be-
tween and within countries. The reduction in economic and social disparities
among regions, enshrined in Article 174 of the Treaty, is the main objective of
the EU Cohesion Policy. This policy, based on the Structural Funds and the Co-
hesion Fund (EUF), is the most extensive and long-lived regional policy across
regions and countries worldwide. It mostly finances large-scale infrastructure
investment in transport, environment, education and other important sectors
such as culture, health, energy or ICT (see European Commission, 2014). A
number of studies have demonstrated that investments in infrastructure, educa-
tion and R&D, financed by the EU Cohesion Policy, have had a positive effect
on economic performance and on the convergence in income and wealth among
European regions (see, among others, Basile et al., 2008; Becker et al., 2010,
Pellegrini et al., 2013). The conclusion is that the Cohesion Policy contributes
directly to the supply of public goods in European regions, and therefore af-
fects, through this channel, the decision to migrate and the final destination of
migration toward Europe.
The scope of our analysis is twofold. First, we investigate the effects of
asymmetries among European regions on the choice of migration. In particular,
we embrace a positive approach of analysis and consider how two (groups of)
regions, which differ in productivity and public good endowments, compete in
tax and public goods to attract or reject migrants, who are also taxpayers. We
assume that the less productive regions receive EUF which increase the panoply
of their public goods. The higher the level of public goods in a region, the
lower the corresponding private expenditure for basic services. Providing public
goods and services is costly. Individuals in each jurisdiction are heterogeneous
with respect to the cost of migration. Each jurisdiction seeks to maximize its
revenue in a three-stage game, where governments first select the optimal level
of public goods and then, at the second stage, the optimal taxation. Citizens
decide where to live at the third stage. We find that, if the productivity gap
between regions is not extremely wide, migration from the more productive
region to the one receiving public transfers can be observed whenever regional
funds are sufficiently high, which is in line with the history of the recent flow of
immigration to many European regions.
Then, we empirically assess the relationship between the EU Cohesion Policy
and migration flows in the EU-15 regions. We identify such a causal relation-
ship by adopting the regression discontinuity design (RDD), which is a quasi-
experimental method with a very high internal validity (Lee and Lemieux, 2010).
Comparing the economic scenario arising under the policy intervention with a
counterfactual situation (what would have happened if the policy had not been
implemented), this method isolates the impact of the EU Cohesion Policy from
the confounding effects induced by other factors (see Mohl and Hagen, 2010).
To this end, we exploit the allocation rule of regional EU transfers: less de-
3
veloped regions, with per capita GDP (in Purchasing Power Standards) below
75 per cent of the EU average, qualify for Objective 1 (Ob.1) status, i.e. they
receive most of the EUF (called “treated” regions). We assume that non-eligible
regions, with a per capita GDP level just above the 75 per cent threshold (called
“non-treated” regions), represent a very good counterfactual scenario to those
just below the threshold (Cerqua and Pellegrini, 2018). We find a wide expan-
sion in the share of foreign citizens in Ob.1 regions due to EUF and mostly
driven by the increase in the number of non-European migrants. The results
are robust to different specifications of the RDD and hold even when we take
into account that regions having at least a border with access to the sea or shar-
ing a border with countries not belonging to the EU-15, that might be more
vulnerable to the arrival of legal and illegal migrants.
Our paper makes three contributions. First, we combine fiscal policy, public
goods and migration in a unified setting. Indeed, we consider the effects of tax
competition among regions with heterogeneous public goods to attract labor
migration flows, while taking into account the role of a regional policy. Our ap-
proach is related to the literature which observes how governments strategically
set their taxation to make the net income of residents particularly attractive
(Epple and Romer, 1991; Gabszewicz et al., 2016; Razin, 2013; Wildasin, 2006).
Nonetheless, as regional policies can hugely enhance the provision of public
goods, we complement this literature considering these policies as a tool for
improving public goods and services, in shaping the optimal taxation. Sec-
ond, although there is a vast empirical literature on the economic impact of
EUF (see the meta-analysis by Dall’Erba and Fang, 2017), the link between the
EU regional policy and migration is arguably an under-researched topic, and
regional data on migration are scarce. The two most relevant exceptions are
Kessler et al. (2011), who adopt a model of residential and political choice,
and Egger et al. (2014), whose analysis is based on a new economic geography
model. However, the empirical analyses of these papers are based on country
level data, which - considering the regional nature of the policy and the large
regional inequalities within most EU countries - lead to a limited explanatory
power of the empirical models used. In our empirical analysis, we have created
a new dataset containing migration flows among European regions at the NUTS
2 level2 for the years 2001 and 2011, considering intra- and extra-European mi-
gration flows. To the best of our knowledge, it is the first time that a similar
dataset has been set up. Finally, the causal relationship between EUF and final
destination is evaluated for the first time, using an RDD. Given the increasing
share of the EU budget devoted to the Cohesion Policy since the mid-1970s and
the dramatic increase in migratory flows to Europe, the policy’s contribution to
the attraction of migrants is crucial information to EU policy makers in shaping
the regional distribution of EUF.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the theoretical model,
while the data and the evaluation method are discussed in Section 3. The results
2 NUTS stands for “Nomenclature of Statistical Territorial Units”. NUTS-2 regions are
defined by minimum and maximum population thresholds of 800 thousand to 3 million in-
habitants and correspond to administrative divisions in EU Member States.
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of the empirical analysis are presented in Section 4, while Section 5 assesses the
robustness of the estimates. The final section concludes the paper.
2 The theoretical model
We analyze a model with two jurisdictions A and B which differ in productive
efficiency and public good endowments. Following Pieretti and Zanaj (2011), a
jurisdiction is viewed here as a region having the power to tax.3 The popula-
tion in each region is uniformly distributed in the interval [0, 1]. No significant
difference is observed between regions in terms of size and population density,
so that, denoting with li the population density in country i, lA = lB = l.
Following Mansoorian and Myers (1993), in this unit interval, types are ranked
according to the cost of migrating from one’s own country to the other. This
cost is assumed to be equal to x for individuals of type x, x ∈ [0, 1]and con-
stitutes the only source of heterogeneity among people. Each type of resident
offers one unit of labor on a national competitive labor market. Labor demand
is expressed by a continuum of firms. They produce with constant return to
scale and offer a competitive wage of wi = αi where αi is labor productivity
in country i , i = A,B. Given wi, residents incur a private expenditure S for
basic services such as healthcare, education and training, or property rights pro-
tection. This private expenditure is however reduced by the panoply of public
goods and services provided by each jurisdiction.4 In order to keep the focus
on the role of regional policy in enhancing public services and thus affecting
migration, we assume that SA = SB = S.
5 The expenditure-reducing effect of
public goods is grasped by ki, which is jurisdiction-specific. Region B which is
supposed to be less productive than region A (wA > wB) receives EUF. Due
to these transfers, this jurisdiction extends its transport network, invests in ed-
ucation and supports public access to healthcare, inter alia. Accordingly, in
3 The structure of our model is formally related to the contributions by Gabszewicz et
al. (2016). In that paper, the authors study labor migration flows between two countries
(regions) with different-sized populations and different levels of productive efficiencies and
evaluate the effects of such flows on income taxation. Departing from them, our key as-
sumption is that one of the two jurisdictions, which do not differ in dimension on average,
receives EUF and, thus, increases the panoply of its public goods and services.
4 A similar approach is adopted by Pieretti and Zanaj (2011) where a private component
of productivity is combined with a public input – public good – supplied by a jurisdiction.
Although their focus is on competition among jurisdictions to attract foreign capital rather
than labor, we are close to them in that they interpret the panoply of public goods in a
jurisdiction as public inputs that enhance firms’ productivity. Also, in Hauptmeier et al.
(2012), the public input raises the marginal productivity of the private input. It somehow
resembles the assumption on the complementarity between private capital and public invest-
ment in the fiscal equalization literature (see, for instance, Hindriks et al., 2008), too.
5 Assuming that S is jurisdiction-specific, namely SA 6= SB would make the analysis
more complicated and would prevent us from grasping the role of public goods and services,
and wage gap in affecting migration, since it would add a further driver to the migration
choice. Alternatively, one could drop the component S from the analysis and interpret wi
as the wage, net of private expenditure. In this case, a priori this wage could be different
between jurisdictions also due to a heterogeneous level of private expenditure.
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jurisdiction B, the private expenditure S is reduced by kB(1 + s), where s
captures the impact of EUF on S.6
The government in each region aims to maximize tax revenues. Residents are
supposed to be free to migrate from their own place to the other, after comparing
the net income that they will obtain in each region.7 This in turn is determined
by wages, net of taxes, and private expenditure for public services. The latter
component is lower, the wider the public services that are guaranteed by the
jurisdiction. Accordingly, the government defines the optimal taxation and the
amount of public goods and services, while taking into account that migration
– with a consequent possible change in the tax base – will be observed as a
reaction to fiscal pressure and public endowment.
2.1 The game
In order to capture the above ingredients of the model, we describe a three-stage
game where governments first select the optimal level of public goods and then,
at the second stage, the optimal taxation. Citizens decide where to live at the
third stage. Further, we introduce a cost for the provision of public goods and
services. This cost is assumed to be quadratic.8 We mainly analyze the role
of EUF in affecting the optimal investment in public goods and services, and,
through this, migration. We start by considering the case when migration occurs
from region A to region B. Then, we move to the reverse case of migration from
B to A.
Migration from A to B
In this scenario, the resident who is indifferent between staying in the origin
country or moving abroad is given by the solution of the following equation
wA − (S − kA)− tA = wB − (S − kB(1 + s))− tB − x
so that
x = kB(1 + s)− kA + (wB − wA)− (tB − tA). (1)
Notice that, given taxes tA and tB the benefit of moving from A to B increases
with the wage gap (wB − wA) and the differential in the contribution of public
goods and services (kB(1 + s)− kA) to private expenditure S.
The set of residents migrating from A to B is thus given by the interval [0, x],
while the complementary interval ]x, 1] represents the set of people deciding to
live in country A. It is immediate to see that migration takes place at equilibrium
if and only if x at equilibrium is strictly positive.
6 Formally, the expenditure-reducing role of public goods can be also related to the pa-
per by Zissimos and Wooders (2008), where public goods reduce firms’ production costs.
7 This is line with Tiebout’s (1956) idea that since “consumers are fully mobile, they will
move to the community where their preference patterns, which are set, are best satisfied”.
8 A convex cost function grasps the increasing difficulty in providing public goods. See
Hauptmeier et al. (2012) for a brief discussion on this point.
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In this scenario, maximizing the payoff functions in regions A and B, ΠA =
tA(lA(1 − x)) − 12k2A and ΠB = tB((lB + lAx) − 12k2B with respect to tA and
tB , respectively, given x as in (1), namely
ΠA = ltA(kA − tA + tB + wA − wB − kB(s+ 1) + 1)− 1
2
k2A
ΠB = tB(l − l(kA − tA + tB + wA − wB − kB(s+ 1)))− 1
2
k2B ,
we obtain the equilibrium configuration at the second stage of the game9:
tA(kA, kB) =
1
3 (kA − (1 + s)kB + wA − wB) + 1,
tB(kA, kB) =
1
3 (((1 + s)kB − kA)− (wA − wB)) + 1 and
x(kA, kB) =
1
3 ((1 + s)kB − kA)− 13 (wA − wB) .
The corresponding payoffs of each government in region A and B are, respec-
tively:10
ΠA(kA, kB) =
1
9
l((1 + s)kB − kA − wA + wB − 3)2 − 1
2
k2A (2)
ΠB(kA, kB) =
1
9
l((1 + s)kB − kA − wA + wB + 3)2 − 1
2
k2B . (3)
It is worth noticing that the optimal taxation in each region is negatively affected
by the access to public goods and services in the rival region, as in Pieretti
and Zanaj (2011).11 This negative strategic effect is further magnified by the
parameter s, so that a significant amount of EU transfers to jurisdiction B
tends to dampen the optimal tax in jurisdiction A, while pushing that in B
upward.
9 From the best-reply functions
tA(tB) =
1
2
tB +
1
2
(kA − kB) + 1
2
(wA − wB)− 1
2
skB +
1
2
tB(tA) =
1
2
tA − 1
2
(kA − kB)− 1
2
(wA − wB) + 1
2
skB +
1
2
,
taxes are strategic complements and these functions have slope less than one. See Appendix
for details on this system of best-reply functions.
10 Details on these equilibrium values are shown in the Appendix.
11 This result is emphasized by Pieretti and Zanaj (2011). As the authors state, it can be
related to the inefficient supply of public goods which emerge in Hindriks et al. (2008) and
Zissimos and Wooders (2008).
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When moving at the first stage of the game, we derive from the maximization
of (2) and (3) with respect to kA and kB , respectively, the best-reply function
ki(kj), with i, j = 1, 2 and i 6= j :
kA(kB) =
1
8
wA − 1
8
(1 + s)kB − 1
8
wB +
3
8
kB(kA) =
1
8−2s−s2 (3s− (1 + s)kA − wA + wB − swA + swB + 3) .
Notice that, while taxes are strategic complements, public goods are strategic
substitutes: the higher the panoply of public goods and services in jurisdiction
i, the lower that in the rival jurisdiction i.
Thus, we can solve for the first stage of the game where each government
defines the optimal plan for public goods. From the profit maximization of
Πi(kA, kB) with respect to ki, i = A,B, we obtain
k∗A =
(2s2 + 4s− 3wA + 3wB − 7)
3s2 + 6s− 21
k∗B =
1
3
(3wA − 3wB − 7)(s+ 1)
2s+ s2 − 7 .
Plugging these optimal values k∗A and k
∗
B in ti(kA, kB) and Πi(kA, kB), i =
A,B, we characterize the equilibrium configuration of the game as:
t∗A =
7− 4s+ 3wA − 3wB − 2s2
7− 2s− s2 ,
t∗B =
7− 3wA + 3wB
7− 2s− s2 and
x∗(t∗A, t
∗
B , k
∗
A, k
∗
B) =
2s− 3wA + 3wB + s2
7− 2s− s2 .
Migration from B to A
In the case with migration from country B to country A, payoff functions
write as
ΠA = tA(lA + lBx) = tA(lA + lB(kA − tA + tB + wA − wB − kB(s+ 1)))− 1
2
k2A
ΠB = tBlB(1− x) = lBtB(tA − kA − tB − wA + wB + kB(s+ 1) + 1)− 1
2
k2B ,
since the last citizen willing to leave country B comes from the solution to the
following equation the condition
8
wB − tB + kB(1 + s) = wA − tA + kA − x .
In line with the above, we can characterize the equilibrium configuration as
follows
t∗∗A = t
∗
A and t
∗∗
B = t
∗
B
k∗∗A = k
∗
A and
x∗∗(t∗∗A , t
∗∗
B ) =
2s− 3wA + 3wB + s2
2s+ s2 − 7 .
We restrict our attention to the case where s2+ 43s+wB− 73 < wA < wB + 73
since this inequality guarantees that t∗A > 0 and t
∗
B > 0.
First of all, we notice that migration from A to B is positive for s > s′,
with s′ =
√
3wA − 3wB + 1 − 1, where s′ increases with wA. Thus, migration
from the region with higher productivity can be observed if and only if regional
funds are very significant. Moreover, from standard algebra, whenever wB >
wˆB ≡ wA − 73 , namely in the case where the wage in country B is not so low
with respect to the wage in region A, migration x∗ from A to B (resp. x∗∗
from B to A) increases (resp. decreases), while k∗A and t
∗
A (resp. k
∗
B and t
∗
B)
decreases (resp. increase) with s.12 The reason for this finding can be expressed
as follows. Whenever productivity in region B is sufficiently high (wB > wˆB), a
higher level of s determines higher equilibrium taxes in region B. These taxes
however do not prevent citizens from migrating to B, due to the corresponding
equilibrium amount of public goods that is observed in this region. Moreover,
since the wage differential does not significantly penalize jurisdiction B, region
A uses fiscal policy as a strategic means to be relatively less unattractive: a
lower taxation in A could prevent its own residents from migrating to B . Of
course, due to this lower level of taxation, the investment in public good in
region A is poor.13
Considering these characterizations, we can state that:
Proposition 1 Under regional funds to region B, there exists a unique SPNE
with migration from the more productive region A to the less productive region
B (resp. B to A) iff regional funds are sufficiently high, namely s > s˘ (resp.
s ≤ s˘).
Proof. x∗(t∗A, t
∗
B , k
∗
A, k
∗
B) T 0⇔ s T s′ ≡
√
3wA − 3wB + 1− 1.
Finally, let us denote by w′A =
1
3s
2+ 23s+wB . Then, s
2+ 43s+wB− 73 < wA.
12 We found that at wB ≤ wˆB , t∗B = 0.
13 This rationale ceases to hold in the case when the wage in region A was far higher than
that in region B, or wB +
7
3
≤ wA. As we stated above, in this scenario t∗B = 0. In this cir-
cumstance, the flow of migrants from A to B does not raise with s: neither the nil taxation
nor regional funds make region B attractive, due to its extremely poor productivity.
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Remark 2 When wA < w
′
A, then jurisdiction B taxes more than the rival A
and offers a better access to public goods and services.
Proof. From standard algebra, t∗A < t
∗
B ⇔ wA < w′A = 13s2 + 23s+ wB .
The key point of our analysis is thus clearly disentangled by the above state-
ments. Regional funds can significantly affect the flow of migration between
regions. For example, migration to region B can be observed even in the case
with t∗A − t∗B < 0, provided that the impact of regional funds is sufficiently
strong (s > s
′
). Still, in the scenario when the productivity gap between re-
gions is extremely large (wA > wB + 1), these funds do not suffice to determine
migration from A to B: in this case, migration is only observed from B to
A. Moreover, these funds raise the taxation gap whenever t∗A < t
∗
B .
3 Data and Methodology
3.1 Data and descriptive statistics
The territorial level of interest in our analysis is the one defined by the EU 2010
nomenclature NUTS-2. To account for net migration, we use census data pro-
vided by Eurostat on the composition of the population in 2001 and 2011 in the
EU-15 NUTS-2 regions.14 This allows us to glean significant differences in the
composition of the population that can be ascribed, at least in part, to the effect
of local policies financed by the EUF, e.g. to the increased public facilities sup-
ply in the highly-financed regions. Eurostat data provide accurate information
on the number of citizens from the reporting country, other EU-countries, other
European countries (those that do not belong to the EU) and non-European
countries. Using census data allows us to escape from problems regarding the
fragmented definition of migrant across EU countries that often constitute a
limiting factor for this kind of analysis. While data concerning the year 2011
were fully available, for the year 2001 data regarding Greece, Belgium, Germany
and French overseas-departments were not available: for the first two countries,
missing data have been retrieved using the figures provided by the Hellenic Sta-
tistical Authority (https://panorama.statistics.gr/en/) and Statistics Belgium
(http://www.vub.ac.be/en/), respectively. Regarding Germany, although the
collection of census data in 2001 was not implemented, the German Federal
Statistics Office collected data on a micro-census covering 800,000 persons, i.e.
a sample size of 1% of German population15 (see Schwarz, 2001). For the pur-
pose of our analysis, the 2001 micro-census enables us to retrieve an accurate
estimate of German population data by nationality and thus fill in the missing
census data. Lastly, data on the four French overseas territories (Guadeloupe,
14 We do not consider the accession countries (EU-12) of 2004 that did not receive EUF
before 2004. This is due to both the peculiarities of our evaluation strategy and to the lack
of citizenship data for most EU-12 countries in 2001.
15 Data from the micro-census of 2001 allows us to trace out information in the time in-
terval between two population censuses. Due to reunification of Germany that occurred in
1989, the most recent census before 2011 was taken in 1987.
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Martinique, Reunion and Guyane) have been gathered from the Atlas National
des Populations Immigre´es of each region published by the Institut National de
la Statistique et des Etudes Economiques.
The availability of data relative to two censuses allows us to calculate the
percentage difference in the share of citizens coming from the reporting country,
other European countries and non-European countries as well as the absolute
differences for each of the above groups. Such variables represent our main out-
come variables. Unfortunately, it is not possible to directly calculate the change
in the share of people with other EU citizenship as data in 2001 refer to EU-15
while data in 2011 refer to EU-27. However, we use the share of EU-27 citizens
and the absolute number of EU-27 citizens in 2011 as additional outcome vari-
ables. We have also collected data on other relevant pre-treatment covariates
using the regional databases of Cambridge Econometrics and Eurostat. These
variables are: the population density, the share of the population over 65, the
total employment divided by the active population,16 labor productivity (GVA
per hour worked), the number of hours worked per employee, the share of em-
ployment in the primary sector and the share of employment in the secondary
sector.
As for the EUF, we split the EU-15 regions into “treated” and “untreated”
following the Ob.1 status assignment process relative to the 2000-2006 pro-
gramming period.17 We focus empirical analysis on the split between Ob.1
and non-Ob.1 regions because Ob.1 expenditures account for more than two
thirds of the Cohesion Policy budget. Furthermore, we collected NUTS-2 re-
gional data on EUF payments from 2001 to 2010 (see Roemisch, 2016). This
continuous measure of treatment allows us to test the sensitivity of the binary
analysis and gain more insights on the causal relationship between EUF and
migration flows. It also allows us to verify that EUF have been used in ac-
cordance with the regional policy objectives. Although the EU regional policy
objectives have slightly changed over the last thirty years, there has always been
a focus on compensating lagging regions for the absence of some preconditions
for growth – infrastructure,18 accessibility, education, and health care (Camagni
and Capello, 2015). Figure 1 shows that there is a clear relationship between the
EUF and education (Panel A - Participation in education and training; Panel
B - Share of citizens with a lower secondary education or below), health system
(Panel C - Available beds per thousand inhabitants), and infrastructure (Panel
D - Motorway density) outcomes during the period under analysis.
16 This variable can take on values above 1 as it represents the number of individuals
working in the region divided by the number of active individuals (in employment or look-
ing for employment) residing in the region.
17 Although our data starts in 2001, i.e. one year after the beginning of the programming
period under analysis, this is not a concern as the bulk of EUF are spent in the final years
of the programming period, including up to two years after the end of the programming
period.
18 Almost one in two euros invested in trying to prop up the EU’s less-developed regions
has targeted infrastructure deficits, particularly those in transport infrastructure (Crescenzi
and Rodr´ıguez-Pose, 2012).
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INSERT FIGURE 1
Before carrying out the main analysis, we map and plot the population vari-
ables to start investigating possible patterns. Figure 2 illustrates the geographic
distribution of the regional foreigner share deciles in 2001 (Panel A) and in 2011
(Panel B). For instance, in 2001, the first decile of regions consists of the regions
with foreigner shares between 0.6% and 1.3%. The regions in the first decile are
indicated in light blue. The tenth decile consists of regions with shares between
9.2% and 26.6%. They are indicated in dark navy. The intermediate deciles
are indicated by intermediate shades of blue. In 2001 the highest shares of for-
eigners were localized at the core of the EU, in the UK, and in Ireland. Ten
years later we observe a somewhat different pattern with a steep increase in the
share of foreigners in many Italian, Portuguese, and Spanish regions. Panel C
of Figure 2 depicts the percentage point difference between the percentage of
foreigners in 2001 and the same variable in 2011 allowing us to clearly identify
the differences in migration trends among regions. A striking feature of this
figure is the extent to which the top decile regions (the ones marked in dark
orange) are concentrated in the periphery of the EU-15.
INSERT FIGURE 2
Figure 3 reports the Ob.1 status assignment for the 2000-2006 programming
period (Panel A) and the EUF per capita during the 2001-2010 period (Panel
B). Both panels show a pattern very similar to the one arising in Figure 2. This
means that the graphical analysis shows the presence of a positive relationship
between EUF and the change in the share of foreigners. Indeed, peripheral
regions tend to have both a higher share of foreigners and a higher EUF per
capita for the period under consideration.
INSERT FIGURE 3
This positive relationship is even clearer in Figure 4 where we plot the re-
lationship between the change in the share of foreigners from 2001 to 2011
and the EUF per capita for the 2001-2010 period using a kernel-weighted local
polynomial smoothing regression. The green line shows that there is a positive
relationship between EUF and percentage of foreigners which flattens out only
at the right-hand side of the fund distributions. Nevertheless, only a rigorous
econometric model can determine whether this relationship is causal or due to
a spurious correlation. This can be achieved comparing regions with similar
characteristics but that have received a large difference in the share of EUF due
to an exogenous assignment rule. This is what we do in the rest of the paper.
INSERT FIGURE 4
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3.2 Methodology
We perform an empirical evaluation of the relationship between the EU regional
policy and migration flows in the EU-15 regions based on the theoretical frame-
work presented in Section 2. Our identification strategy exploits the allocation
rule of regional EU transfers: only regions with a per capita GDP in PPS below
75 per cent of the EU average (calculated as an average of three years before the
beginning of the programming period) are qualified for Ob.1 funds, i.e. receive
a considerable amount of the EUF. This means that regions with a per capita
GDP level just above 75% of the EU average (which did not receive the Ob.1
funds) can be considered good comparisons to those just below the cutoff (which
did receive the Ob.1 funds). Indeed, economies at similar per capita income lev-
els share many structural attributes, including their levels of education, science
and technology endowments, infrastructure quality, and institutional quality
(Iammarino et al., 2018). This sharp discontinuity can be exploited via the
RDD (see, inter alia, Hahn et al., 2001; Lee and Lemieux, 2010), an economet-
ric method which compares regions lying closely on either side of the threshold
and delivers an estimation of the local average treatment effect (LATE), i.e. the
average treatment effect around the threshold. For those regions in the interval
just above and below this threshold, the assignment of the treatment (i.e. Ob.1
funds) is to be considered as good as randomized. In other words, the RDD
is equivalent to a local random assignment around the cut-off point. Lastly,
the use of the RDD overcomes the inverse causality problem, which implicitly
affects this kind of analysis.
Given that the Ob.1 status assignment for the 2000-2006 programming pe-
riod followed a clear assignment rule,19 we adopt the sharp RDD framework:
Y = a+ f(x) +D[τ + f(x)] + ε
where Y is the dependent variable (e.g. the percentage-points change in the
share of foreigners with European citizenship between 2001 and 2011), x is the
forcing variable (GDP per capita (EU-15=100, PPS) in 1994-1996), D is the
treatment dummy and f(·) is a smooth polynomial functions of x. In our case,
f(·) is a second-order polynomial allowed to have different parameters to the
left and the right of the threshold. Consistent with the RDD approach, in the
main analysis we do not include the richest regions, defined as those regions
with a pre-treatment GDP per capita of more than twice the Ob.1 assignment
threshold.
19 In our sample there is only one NUTS-2 region receiving the Ob.1 status (only on part
of the territory) despite a pre-treatment per capita GDP level above the 75% threshold.
This is the Finnish region of Pohjois-Suomi (FI1A). However, due to a change in borders
of some regions across nomenclatures we were forced to merge the Ob.1 region Ita¨-Suomi
(FI13) with the partially Ob.1 region Pohjois-Suomi (FI1A) into the region Pohjois- ja Ita¨-
Suomi (FI1D). We include this region in the main analysis taking the forcing variable value
of FI13 which is below the 75% threshold. Alternatively, if we considered a weighted aver-
age of the two forcing variable values, we would get a forcing variable value that exceeds the
75% threshold, making it a non-complier region. Nevertheless, we will consider this alterna-
tive of the forcing variable value in the sensitivity analysis, where we adopt a fuzzy RDD.
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We then repeat the same analysis with the addition of the pre-treatment
covariates X described in Section 3.1 to the RDD model. This addition increases
the precision of the RDD estimator, accounting for the potential bias due to
pretreatment differences (see Fro¨lich and Huber, 2018):
Y = a+ f(x) +D[τ + f(x)] + γX + ε
Besides, the use of percentage and absolute differences of the three main
dependent variables allows us to lower the variance in the RDD estimator (Lee
and Lemieux, 2010) and to take into account pre-treatment differences in the
dependent variable.
4 Results
The estimation procedure begins with some graphical evidence as suggested
by Lee and Lemieux (2010). A simple way to evaluate the effect of EUF on
migration is to plot the relationship between each dependent variable and the
forcing variable (pre-treatment GDP per capita) for regions on either side of the
75% cut-off point.
Figure 5 plots each of the main dependent variables for the period from
2001 to 2011 for Ob.1 regions against non-Ob.1 regions. In each graph, the
cut-off line sharply separates the treated and untreated regions. Each figure
superimposes the fit of a nonparametric flexible polynomial regression model
(estimated separately on each side of the cut-off point), together with the 95%
confidence bands. Figure 5 clearly shows that, on average, the share of foreigners
in Ob.1 regions increased more than in non-Ob.1 regions. This change seems to
be due to both European and non-European citizens.
INSERT FIGURE 5
Although the graphical evidence is important in showing possible differences
between treated and untreated regions around the Ob.1 assignment threshold,
a formal RDD regression allows us to calculate the extent of the observed dif-
ferences and whether they are statistically different from zero. The results are
presented in Table 1. Columns 1 and 2 report the EUF impact on the share of
citizens with host country citizenship with and without pre-treatment covariates
X. This impact is negative and statistically significant at the 5% level in both
specifications. The extent of the difference in the share of citizens with host
country citizenship over the period from 2001-2011 is -2.09 percentage points in
Ob.1 regions. This corresponds to a large increase in the share of foreigners as
in EU-15 NUTS-2 regions the average share of foreigners was 4.84% in 2001 and
6.45% in 2011. In the remaining columns we investigate whether this increase
is mostly due to foreigners with European citizenship (columns 3 and 4) or to
extra-Europeans (columns 5 and 6). Although all coefficients are positive, only
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the one concerning the increase in the share of non-Europeans citizens is statis-
tically significant from zero at the 5% level in both specifications. This means
that in the period under analysis there was a wide expansion in the share of
foreign citizens in Ob.1 regions due to EUF and mostly driven by the increase
in non-Europeans. Lastly, although we do not have data on the pre-treatment
value for the share of people with other EU citizenship referring to EU-27, in
columns 7 and 8 we check whether there are significant differences in the share
of individuals with EU-27 citizenship in 2011. We find no statistically signifi-
cant effect confirming that most of the immigrants come from non-Europeans
countries.
INSERT TABLE 1
So far, we have looked at the difference in shares of groups of citizens with
different citizenships, i.e. host country, European and non-European. Although
this analysis is informative in showing the migration trends among regions, in
the following we complement it looking at the actual flows of citizens in and
out of the regions as differences in shares of individuals might conceal other
patterns. For instance, an increase in the share of foreigners might derive from
a migration of citizens from the host country rather than from an actual increase
in the number of migrants from other countries. Table 2 replicates the analysis
above looking at the net migration changes between 2001 and 2011 for each
group of individuals under analysis.
INSERT TABLE 2
The estimates reported in Table 2 show that our findings are mainly driven
by the arrivals of foreign migrants - especially those coming from non-European
countries - rather than by a reduction of individuals with a host country cit-
izenship. The average increase of over 30,000 individuals from non-European
countries for Ob.1 regions is sizable especially considering that the average num-
ber of individuals with a non-European citizenship living in Ob.1 regions close
to the Ob.1 threshold (with a per capita GDP in PPS) in 2011 was 50,251.20
5 Robustness and sensitivity checks
We begin this section testing whether the pre-treatment covariates of the Ob.1
regions are similar to those of the control group at the threshold. As shown in
the first two columns of Table 3, Ob.1 and non-Ob.1 regions are quite different
- on average - with respect to pre-treatment values on population, citizenship
composition, education and economy. However, the third column of Table 3
shows that there is no evidence of statistically significant pre-treatment differ-
ences around the cut-off point between Ob.1 and non-Ob.1 regions in terms of
20 This finding is economically relevant as the increase in migration stocks positively af-
fects firms’ performance (see Borelli et al., 2017).
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citizenship composition, population density, share of the population over 65,
labor productivity, hours worked, share of employment in the primary and sec-
ondary sectors and education level. On the other hand, we find that non-Ob.1
regions have a higher ratio of total employment divided by the active population
(10% statistical significance). These results confirm that Ob.1 and non-Ob.1 re-
gions around the Ob.1 status assignment threshold are quite similar with respect
to pre-treatment covariates but also that some slight differences remain. This
is the main reason why we control for these variables in the main analysis.
INSERT TABLE 3
We then check the sensitivity of the estimates in several regards and sum-
marize the results of interest in Table 4. For the sake of brevity, we focus on
sensitivity checks for the RDD model with covariates reported in columns 2, 4
and 6 of Table 1. Table 4 contains five blocks of results in a vertical dimension,
numbered (I)-(V).
One concern with our empirical analysis is that we split regions according
to the Ob.1 status assigned for the programming period 2000-2006 even if our
migration variables refer to a longer time period. The availability of data on
EUF per capita during the 2001-2010 period allows us to check whether our re-
sults depend on this choice. Dropping all non-Ob.1 regions which received EUF
per capita larger than the least treated Ob.1 region, we obtain the estimates
reported in block (I) of Table 4. The extent of these estimates suggests that
EUF had an even larger impact on Ob.1 regions after we dropped the 11 “most
financed” non-Ob.1 regions. This result is consistent with our finding that the
larger the EUF per capita, the higher the increase in the share of foreigners.
Regions having at least one border with access to the sea might be more
vulnerable to the arrival of legal and illegal migrants. The same rationale might
apply to regions sharing a border with regions not belonging to the EU-15. We
checked the sensitivity of our results adding a dummy for each of the above
factors to the RDD regressions. Results are reported in block (II) of Table 4
and show that our main findings hold.
Block (III) reports three sensitivity checks on the RDD specification. We
start by checking whether our results depend on the chosen order of polynomial
of f(·) by repeating the analysis for the 1st and the 3rd order polynomials. The
estimates turn out to be very close to those reported in Table 1 even though
if the ones obtained with the 3rd order polynomials are even larger. We also
check whether using a non-parametric estimator we get similar estimates. Using
a local polynomial non-parametric regression, we select an optimal bandwidth
that minimizes the mean squared-error using the bias-corrected RDD estimator
with robust confidence intervals developed by Calonico et al. (2014). Besides, we
use a triangular kernel and control for pre-treatment covariates X (see Calonico
et al., 2018). All estimated coefficients are larger than those reported in Table
1 and also turn out to be statistically significant for citizens with European
passports. Block (III) findings suggest that a more flexible specification of
the forcing variable leads to larger estimates which reinforce the hypothesis of
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enhanced attractiveness of treated regions close to the threshold engendered by
improved infrastructure, health system and education outcomes via EUF.
Although we are in a quasi-experimental evaluation framework, we have
already seen that controlling for relevant pre-treatment covariates affects the
extent of the estimates. Therefore, it is possible that the addition of other
relevant covariates might change our results. Eurostat provides data on average
education levels of citizens aged 25-64 in all NUTS-2 regions except for the
four French overseas-departments in 2001. Adding the share of citizens with
low-level education (defined as lower secondary education or below) and the
share of citizens with low medium-level education (defined as upper secondary
or post-secondary non-tertiary education) we obtain the estimates reported in
row 5 of Table 4. Again, these estimates are very close to those reported in
Table 1. It is also possible that EUF take a long time before showing any
impact on migration flows, as it takes a long time to improve infrastructures,
health system and education system. This is why we add to X the per capita
EUF that each region received during the period 1994-2000. As shown in block
(IV), this additional covariate does not affect significantly our estimates.
Lastly, in block (V) we check whether data and sample choices impacted on
the estimates. First, as anticipated in footnote 18, we check whether considering
the Finnish region Pohjois- ja Ita¨-Suomi (FI1D) as a non-complier alters our
results. To do so we adopt the fuzzy RDD estimator. We then verify that the
results do not depend on the exclusion of the nine regions whose level of per
capita GDP in the period 1994-1996 was at least twice as large as the Ob.1
assignment threshold. Nevertheless, both sensitivity checks result in estimates
which are in the range of those of columns 2, 4 and 6 of Table 1.
INSERT TABLE 4
6 Conclusions
Europe is nowadays welcoming a large flow of migrants, mostly from Asian coun-
tries and the southern Mediterranean coast. European policy makers need the
tools to understand and manage these migration flows, in order to operational-
ize the complex adjustment process of immigrants with the economic and social
context of European regions. This paper has led to some results of interest for
an evaluation of the forces that attract migrants. First, the welfare ensured by
the EUF, in terms of access to education, health and other sources of well-being,
appears to be an important motivation in the localization choices of migrants.
This is demonstrated by an economic model that shows how in some cases the
productivity differential, and therefore the wages differential, is not in itself
sufficient motivation to direct the migratory flow, and welfare considerations
matter. Second, the empirical analysis carried out supports the conclusions of
the theoretical model: ceteris paribus, the EUF appear to strongly influence the
direction of migratory flows. In particular, the EUF lead to a significant increase
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in the share of foreign citizens in the highly-subsidized regions of around 2 per-
centage points. This corresponds to a large increase in the share of foreigners as
in EU-15 NUTS-2 regions the average share of foreigners was 4.84% in 2001 and
6.45% in 2011. Such an increase is mostly driven by non-European immigrants,
while the increase in the share of European foreign immigrants connected to the
EUF is positive but not significant, consistently with the result that the EUF
tend to reduce labor mobility within Europe (see Schmidt, 2013). This implies
that the use of EUF to offer a high-quality welfare, which includes education,
health, infrastructure and facilities for welcoming immigrants, acts as a mag-
net for foreign workers and helps retain local workers by increasing the labor
supply and therefore the potential growth. Our estimates suggest that previous
empirical studies might have underestimated the importance of public goods
and services in attracting immigrants. We argue that this is due to the use of
detailed data at regional level and to the adoption of an evaluation strategy
which allowed us to convincingly isolate the role of public goods and services
from economic factors.
Our findings may guide policy makers in selecting the right interventions
able to influence and canalize migration flows as a component of an integrated
European regional development strategy (Mitze et al., 2017). While the rather
low degree of geographical mobility within and across EU Member States has
been a matter of concern for growth in past decades, the future question is how
the new labor supply can be efficiently integrated into the local labor systems
to sustain local development. An efficient use of public transfers can help in
this direction.
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7 Appendix
Hereafter, formal details on the tax game are provided.
7.1 A1 Migration from A to B
Let us consider migration occurring from region A to region B, this latter being
the recipient of EUF. In this scenario, from the maximization of ΠA with respect
to tA, we get tA =
1
2kA − 12kB + 12 tB + 12wA − 12wB − 12skB + 12 .
Since migration requires x > 0, namely
x(tA, tB , kA, kB) = kB(1 + s)− kA + wB − wA − (tB − tA)) > 0 or
tA > kA + tB + wA − wB − kB(s+ 1) ,
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then it must be that
1
2
kA − 1
2
kB +
1
2
tB +
1
2
wA − 1
2
wB − 1
2
skB +
1
2
> (kA + tB + wA − wB − kB(s+ 1)) or
tB < kB − kA − wA + wB + skB + 1.
Thus,
tA(tB) =
1
2
kA − 1
2
kB +
1
2
tB +
1
2
wA − 1
2
wB − 1
2
skB +
1
2
if tB < kB − kA − wA + wB + skB + 1
t′′A(tB) = kA + tB + wA − wB − kB(s+ 1) if tB > kB − kA − wA + wB + skB + 1
with the corresponding payoff being
ΠA(tA, tB , kA, kB) =
1
4
l(−kA + kB − tB − wA + wB + skB − 1)2
Π′′A(tA, tB , kA, kB) = l(kA − kB + tB + wA − wB − skB)
We focus then on region B. In line with the above, from the maximization
of ΠA with respect to tA we get that tB(tA) =
1
2l (l − kAl + kBl + ltA − lwA +
lwB + skBl). Recall that for migration from A to B, it must be that
x(tA, tB , kA, kB) = (tA − tB)− (wA − wB) + kB(1 + s)− kA > 0
or tB < kB − kA + tA − wA + wB + skB
Then, the following holds:
tB(tA) =
1
2
(−kA + kB + tA − wA + wB + skB + 1) if tA > (1 + kA − kB + wA − wB − skB)
tB(t
′
A) = kB − kA + tA − wA + wB + kBs if tA ≤ (1 + kA − kB + wA − wB − skB)
with the corresponding payoff being
ΠB(tB(tA), kA, kB)) =
1
4
l(1− kA + kB + tA − wA + wB + skB)2 and
ΠB(t
′
B(t
′
A), kA, kB) = l(−kA + kB + tA − wA + wB + skB) .
7.2 A.2 Migration from B to region A
In this case, payoff functions write as
ΠA = tA(l + lx) = tA(lA + lB(kA − tA + tB + wA − wB − kB(s+ 1)))
ΠB = tBlB(1− x) = lBtB(tA − kA − tB − wA + wB + kB(s+ 1) + 1)
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and x comes from the condition wB − tB + kB(1 + s) = wA− tA + kA− x so
that
x(tA, tB , kA, kB) = kA − tA + tB + wA − wB − kB(s+ 1)
From the FOC, we obtain
tA(kA, kB) =
1
2
(1 + kA − kB + tB + wA − wB − skB) .
Since x > 0 iff
kA − tA + tB + wA − wB − kB(s+ 1) > 0 or
tA < kA + tB + wA − wB − kB(s+ 1)
it must be that
kA + tB + wA − wB − kB(s+ 1)− (1
2
(1 + kA − kB + tB + wA − wB − skB)) < 0 or
tB > (1− kA + kB − wA + wB + skB) .
Accordingly, we can write:
tA(tB , (kA, kB)) =
1
2
(1 + kA − kB + tB + wA − wB − skB)
if tB >
1
lB
(lA − kAlB + kBlB − lBwA + lBwB + skBlB)
t′A(tB , (kA, kB)) = kA + tB + wA − wB − kB(s+ 1)
if tB <
1
lB
(lA − kAlB + kBlB − lBwA + lBwB + skBlB)
with the corresponding payoff being
ΠA =
1
4
l((1 + s)kB − kA − tB − wA + wB − 1)2
Π′A = l(kA − kB + tB + wA − wB − skB) .
So, combining the above analysis, we can write
tA(tB) =
1
2
tB +
1
2
(kA − kB) + 1
2
(wA − wB)− 1
2
skB +
1
2
tB(tA) =
1
2
tA − 1
2
(kA − kB)− 1
2
(wA − wB) + 1
2
skB +
1
2
.
As far as the tax equilibrium configuration, let us remind that s˘ = 1kB (kA−
kB + wA − wB). Then, we observe that:
• t∗A < wA ⇔ s > s∗A = kA−kB−2wA−wB+3kB , with s˘ > s∗A iff wA > 1 since
s˘− s∗A = 3wA−1kB ;
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• t∗A > 0 namely 13 (kA − kB + wA − wB − skB) + 1 > 0 iff s < s′′A =
1
kB
(kA − kB + wA − wB + 3), with s′′A > s˘;
• t∗B < wB⇔ s < s∗B = 1kB (kA− kB +wA + 2wB − 3) with s∗B >s˘ iff wB > 1
since s∗B−s˘ = 3wB−1kB and s∗B >s∗A whenever wi > 1, i = A,B;
• t∗B > 0⇔s > s′′B = 1kB (kA − kB + wA − wB − 3) with s′′ < s˘ < s∗B .
• Finally, t∗A > 0 and t∗B > 0 can simultaneously hold since s′′B < s′′A.
Finally, an equilibrium with migration from A to B (resp. B to A) cannot
simultaneously be an equilibrium with migration from B to A. For this to be
clear, it suffices to notice that x∗(t∗A(kA, kB), t
∗
B(kA, kB)) =
1
3 ((1+s)kB−kA)−
1
3 (wA−wB) > 0 for any s > s′ = 1kB (kA−kB+wA−wB), while x∗∗s=s′(kA, kB) = 0
and x∗∗(kA, kB) being decreasing in s.
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Table 1: RDD parametric estimates for migration shares net changes outcomes 
 
Dep. Var.: Percentage 
points change in the share 
of citizens with host 
country citizenship (2001-
2011) 
 
Dep. Var.: Percentage 
points change in the share 
of foreigners with 
European citizenship 
(2001-2011) 
 Dep. Var.: Percentage 
points change in the share 
of foreigners with non-
European citizenship 
(2001-2011) 
 Dep. Var.: Percentage of 
foreigners with a EU-27 
citizenship (2011) 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6)  (7) (8) 
Dummy Ob.1 -2.36 -2.09  1.03 0.49  1.33 1.61  0.79 0.56 
 (1.04)** (1.08)**  (0.59)* (0.62)  (0.63)** (0.68)**  (0.83) (0.88) 
Other covariates No Yes  No Yes  No Yes  No Yes 
R-squared  0.0670 0.1635  0.0534 0.2523  0.0472 0.1218  0.1312 0.2177 
Nb. of treated regions 54 54  54 54  54 54  54 54 
Nb. of non-treated regions 150 150  150 150  150 150  150 150 
Note: Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. Parametric regressions include a second-order polynomial in the forcing variable. The 
polynomial functions are allowed to have different parameters to the left and the right of the threshold 
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Table 2: RDD parametric estimates for migration flows net changes outcomes 
 
Dep. Var.: Change in the 
number of citizens with 
host country citizenship 
(2001-2011) 
 
Dep. Var.: Change in the 
number of foreigners with 
European citizenship 
(2001-2011) 
 Dep. Var.: Change in the 
number of foreigners with 
non-European citizenship 
(2001-2011) 
 Dep. Var.: Number of 
foreigners with a EU-27 
citizenship (2011) 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6)  (7) (8) 
Dummy Ob.1 21,025 226  30,255 17,647  34,104 36,159  59,568 45,922 
 (59,272) (64,561)  (25,308) (30,539)  (18,824)* (19,690)*  (32,304)* (35,203) 
Other covariates No Yes  No Yes  No Yes  No Yes 
R-squared  0.1139 0.2612  0.0404 0.1564  0.0627 0.1382  0.0914 0.1609 
Nb. of treated regions 54 54  54 54  54 54  54 54 
Nb. of non-treated 
regions 150 150  150 150 
 
150 150 
 
150 150 
Note: See notes of Table 1 
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Table 3. RDD estimates of the pre-treatment differences in migration related covariates 
between Ob.1 and non-Ob.1 regions 
Pre-treatment variable 
Average in Ob.1 
regions 
Average in non-
Ob.1 regions 
Differences at the 
margin 
Share of citizens with host country citizenship 96.06 94.84 -1.34 
(1.36) 
Share of citizens with EU-15 citizenship (different from host 
country) 
0.61 1.42 0.10 
  (0.38) 
Share of citizens with European citizenship (different from 
host country) 
2.05 2.80 1.32 
(0.99) 
Share of citizens with a non-European citizenship 1.89 2.36 0.02 
(0.78) 
Population density 393 299 601 
(399) 
Share of population over 65 15.56 14.85 0.27 
(1.58) 
Total employment/Active population 0.87 0.94 0.05 
(0.03)* 
Productivity (GVA per hour worked) 22,142 32,895 -3,434 
(2,865) 
Share in the primary sector 10.68 3.34 -1.23 
(1.94) 
Share in the secondary sector 13.58 18.43 -0.06 
(2.21) 
Hours worked per employee 1.84 1.61 0.16 
(0.11) 
Share of population from 25 to 64 years with a low-level 
education 
51.77 34.37 6.23 
(6.04) 
Share of population from 25 to 64 years with a medium-
level education 
30.99 43.39 -3.59 
(4.74) 
Note: The share of citizens with EU-15 citizenship and education variables are not available for the four French overseas-
departments. Besides, we exclude Belgian regions for the share of citizens with EU-15 citizenship as Statistics Belgium provided 
the EU-27 value instead of the EU-25 value. Low-level education is defined as lower secondary education or below; medium-
level education is defined as upper secondary or post-secondary non-tertiary education; high level education is defined as 
tertiary education or above. Statistics on the non-Ob.1 regions do not include the richest regions defined as those regions with 
a pre-treatment GDP per capita more than twice the Ob1 assignment threshold. 
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Table 4. Robustness and sensitivity checks 
Type of sensitivity/robustness check 
Percentage points 
change in the share of 
citizens with host 
country citizenship 
(2001-2011) 
Percentage points 
change in the share of 
foreigners with 
European citizenship 
(2001-2011) 
Percentage points 
change in the share of 
foreigners with non-
European citizenship 
(2001-2011) 
(1) Intensity of treatment    
- Drop non-Ob.1 regions receiving more per-
capita money than the lowest paid Ob.1 
regions 
-2.64 
(1.02)** 
0.72 
(0.63) 
1.93 
(0.65)*** 
(2) Border dummies    
- Add coastline dummy  -2.14 
(1.08)** 
0.49 
(0.63) 
1.65 
(0.67)** 
- Add dummy border with non-EU-15 
countries 
-2.28 
(1.10)** 
0.68 
(0.63) 
1.60 
(0.69)** 
(3) RDD specification    
- ( )f   specified as 1st order polynomial -2.23 
(0.81)*** 
0.66 
(0.44) 
1.56 
(0.53)*** 
- ( )f   specified as 3rd order polynomial -2.43 
(1.35)* 
0.71 
(0.79) 
1.72 
(0.77)** 
- Non-parametric RDD -3.45 
(1.63)** 
1.92 
(0.85)** 
1.72 
(1.03)* 
(4) Add supplementary control variables    
- Add education variables -2.11 
(0.93)** 
0.51 
(0.55) 
1.60 
(0.61)*** 
- Add past intensity variables -1.98 
(1.05)* 
0.44 
(0.61) 
1.54 
(0.65)** 
(5) Data and sample issues    
- Fuzzy RDD -1.97 
(1.06)* 
0.45 
(0.61) 
1.52 
(0.67)** 
- Add the 9 richest regions -2.43 
(0.79)*** 
0.50 
(0.43) 
1.93 
(0.54)*** 
Note: All specifications include control variables X. Education variables are not available for the four French overseas-
departments. 
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Figure 1. Relationship between EUF per capita during the 2001-2010 period and the change in education, health and infrastructure 
variables measured between 2001 and 2011 
Panel A - Participation in education and training 
 
Panel B - Share of citizens with a low-level qualification 
 
Panel C - Available beds per thousand inhabitants 
 
Panel D - Motorway density 
 
Notes: We used local polynomial smooth curves and their 95% conﬁdence interval (computed using Stata’s command lpolyci). We miss information on the four 
French overseas-departments in panels A and B; for the latter panel we miss information also on the two autonomous Portuguese regions and two Hellenic regions. 
In panels C and D we miss information on Denmark, most of the UK and Germany. In panel C we also miss information on Greece and some Portuguese regions, 
while in panel D we do not have data on the Netherlands and Ireland. 
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Figure 2. Share of the population with a nationality different from that of the host country 
(NUTS-2 regions in the EU-15) 
Panel A - Year 2001 
 
Panel B - Year 2011 
 
Panel C - Growth in the share of foreigner population during the period 2001-2011 
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Figure 3. EUF per capita during the period 2001-2010 (NUTS-2 regions in the EU-15) 
Panel A - EUF assignment status 
 
Panel B - EUF per capita during the period 2001-2010 
 
Notes: A phasing-out system is granted to those regions which were eligible for Objective 1 
funding in the previous programming period but that had a per capita GDP higher than 75 percent 
of the EU average for the 2000-2006 programming period. 
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Figure 4. Relationship between EUF per capita during the 2001-2010 period and the 
percentage points change in the share of foreigners between 2001 and 2011 
 
Notes: We used a local polynomial smooth curve and its 95% conﬁdence interval (computed 
using Stata’s command lpolyci).   
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Figure 5. Percentage points change in the share of citizens with host country citizenship, 
European citizenship and non-European citizenship at the discontinuity between Ob.1 
and non-Ob.1 regions in EU-15 during the 2001-2011 period. 
Panel A - Percentage points change in the share of citizens with host country citizenship 
 
Panel B - Percentage points change in the share of foreigners with European citizenship 
(different from host country) 
 
Panel C - Percentage points change in the share of foreigners with non-European citizenship 
 
Notes: Each figure superimposes the fit of a nonparametric flexible polynomial regression model (estimated separately on each 
side of the cut-off point), together with the 95% confidence bands. 
